Central European MEPs as Agents of Two Principals: Party Cohesion in the European Parliament after Enlargement by Bíró-Nagy, András
www.ssoar.info
Central European MEPs as Agents of Two
Principals: Party Cohesion in the European
Parliament after Enlargement
Bíró-Nagy, András
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Bíró-Nagy, A. (2016). Central European MEPs as Agents of Two Principals: Party Cohesion in the European
Parliament after Enlargement. European Quarterly of Political Attitudes and Mentalities, 5(4), 46-59. https://nbn-
resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-48655-2
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz
(Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence
(Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information
see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
  
 
Corresponding Author: András Bíró-Nagy, Junior Research Fellow 
Affiliation: Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Centre for Social Sciences 
Address: Országház str. 30, 1014 Budapest, Hungary 
e-mail: biro-nagy.andras@tk.mta.hu  
 
Copyright @ 2016, András Bíró-Nagy 
European Quarterly of Political Attitudes and Mentalities - EQPAM, Volume 5, No.4, October 2016, pp. 46-59. 
ISSN 2285 – 4916 
ISSN–L 2285 – 4916 
 
 
 
European Quarterly of Political Attitudes and Mentalities EQPAM  
Volume 5, No.4, October 2016 
                  ISSN 2285 – 4916 
                  ISSN-L 2285 - 4916 
Open Access at  https://sites.google.com/a/fspub.unibuc.ro/european-quarterly-of-political-attitudes-and-mentalities/ 
 
Page 46 
 
 
Central European MEPs as Agents of Two Principals.  
Party Cohesion in the European Parliament after Enlargement 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
András -Nagy Bíró
Junior Research Fellow 
Center for Social Sciences 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
Hungary 
 
 
Date of submission:  October 16th, 2016                               Date of acceptance: October 23rd, 2016 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Abstract  
This paper investigates the impact of Central European MEPs on party cohesion in the European Parliament. By 
applying the principal-agent theory, it is also analyzed how loyal are the MEPs of the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia to their European political groups and national parties. The empirical research 
carried out in this study demonstrates that the Central European MEPs have not brought more division to their 
political groups, but have been loyal members of their European parties. The Central European MEPs have not 
weakened the cohesion of the EP party groups, but party cohesion was even further strengthened between 2004 
and 2014. Cohesion is the strongest in the biggest parliamentary groups. EPP and S&D set the direction for most 
politicians on most occasions. Clear ’rebel’ cases, when national parties as a whole went against their European 
political groups are not more than 2-3 percent of all votes in the two biggest European political families. National 
parties have a bigger room of manoeuvre in the smaller political groups. In ECR and GUE-NGL the difference 
between loyalty to the national party and the European party group is significantly higher than in EPP and S&D. 
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1. Introduction: MEPs as Agents of Two Principals 
Despite the fact that Central European countries have been member states of the European Union for over a decade, 
the knowledge about the activities of their Members of the European Parliament (MEPs1) is still very limited both in 
the academic world and among ordinary citizens.  What important topics are MEPs engaged in and how these issues 
affect citizens often goes without significant media coverage, and it is even more so when it comes to the voting 
behavior of the representatives and the internal institutional mechanisms of the European Parliament.  
The lack of research about the activities of the Central European MEPs is especially regrettable if we take 
into account the outstandingly intriguing political context in which MEPs work. MEPs are selected by their national 
parties, which are the ones to send them to represent their values and interests in Brussels and Strasbourg. All 
representatives are voted for their five-year long mandate in their home countries. Since EP elections are held at the 
national level, politicians arrive to serve in the European Parliament after being elected in different electoral systems. 
Therefore, close connections to the domestic politics of their home country is given. Moreover, having a good 
relationship and regular contacts with the sending party is not only a moral imperative, but it is also the key to re-
election and is vital to build a long-term political career in the EP (Hix-Hoyland 2013). For this reason, the party 
leadership of the sending parties possesses very important power tools which have the potential to exercise serious 
political influence on the MEPs delegated by them.      
On the one hand, there is always a possibility that MEPs get advice from back home regarding what they 
should do. On the other hand, voting behavior of an MEP might be influenced to a large extent by the pressure 
coming from their own party group in the European Parliament. The factors behind the influencing potential of a 
European party group are completely different to that of the national parties. Gail McElroy (2001: 3) argued that “the 
European Parliament lacks the incentives that are necessary to keep the party groups disciplined”.  This statement is 
only partly true. The European Parliament’s internal logic differs from that of the national parliaments as it lacks the 
traditional government-opposition divide due to its special place within the institutional structure of the European 
Union. Another huge difference is that the party groups of the European Parliament do not have the right to nominate 
their members. Therefore, European party groups miss the most important tool to exercise pressure over their 
members: the decisive role in the candidate selection process.  
However, there are some more sophisticated instruments at their disposal. Such instruments include the 
nomination for the most prestigious positions of the EP and within the party groups, and the distribution of positions 
and policy-based tasks in the committees. Those politicians who harbor long-term ambitions and do not consider 
Brussels and Strasbourg the quite end of their career have outstanding career-building opportunities in the European 
Parliament (Verzichelli-Edinger 2005, Bíró-Nagy 2016). An MEP has numerous instruments to build up a strong 
political/policy profile that is not only helpful in gaining professional reputation but to reach high-level positions within 
the European party groups and the institutional structure of the EP as well. It is also worth to note that being a 
parliamentarian in the EP makes it possible that with competent policy work and “defending the national interests” 
further reputation can be won among the electorate of the sending country. Speeches at the plenary sessions might 
be also used to influence the domestic political scene. Furthermore, a clear political profile built during the EP years 
can help (re-)enter domestic politics. This brief summary indicates that adapting to the norms and inner mechanisms 
of the EP might be also of key importance to the representatives since this strategy might be extremely fruitful 
regarding their long-term political career goals.  
These introductory remarks connect directly to the “principal-agent” approach of Simon Hix and his co-
authors (Hix et al. 2007: 133-136), which also provides the theoretical framework to this study. The leading scholars 
of this field of research regard the EP as an institution where the representatives (agents) have two principals: their 
                                                     
1
 Abbreviations: ALDE - Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe; EFD – Europe of Freedom and Democracy; EP – 
European Parliament; EPP – European People’s Party; EPRG - European Parliamentary Research Group; ECR – European 
Conservatives and Reformists; GUE/NGL – European United Left-Nordic Green Left; MEP – Member of the European 
Parliament; ODS - Občanská Demokratická Strana (Civic Democratic Party); S&D – Progressive Alliance of Socialists and 
Democrats. 
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national parties and the party groups of the EP. Hix et al. argue that MEPs may get between two fires as they have to 
take into account both the national and European political dimension during their work. They have to correspond to 
the wishes of their sending parties (or depending on the personality, to the ideal of standing up for the “national 
interest”) and follow the political line of their EP party group at the same time.  
By an empirical analysis of the voting records, this paper is looking for an answer to the question: which 
principal is the stronger? Does the national party political embeddedness dominate among the MEPs of the five 
Central European countries that acceded to the EU together in 2004 (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, 
Slovenia) or party cohesion at the European level proves to be stronger than the national dimension? Investigating 
the voting behavior of the MEPs becomes even more important in the light of the growing powers of the European 
Parliament. Looking at the votes helps better understand the internal dynamics and the major motivations that move 
party competition as well.  
While the European Parliament is still often considered a relatively weak institution, the fact that the EP has 
the right to amend and block laws, would place this institution among the parliaments with “strong policy-making 
power” (Mezey 1979: 155). The European Parliament has become a veto player (Tsebelis 2005) in more and more 
policy fields. As a consequence of the Lisbon Treaty, co-decision is used as the ordinary legislative procedure in 
more than 40 new fields. This development has given more weight to the decisions of the EP and for this reason it 
must count with a new wave of interest groups appearing in Brussels. As Wessels (1999) argues, where the EP 
receives more power, it attracts more attention on behalf of the lobbyists as well. The stronger law-making position 
might make the MEPs more interesting for the national governments and their sending parties too: the stakes are 
higher in the EP, it might be worth to influence them more than before. As the European Parliament’s role has 
become more important in the institutional structure of the European Union, it is also more vital to the European party 
groups to appear as united voting blocks and secure the majority behind their policy initiatives.  
In the first part I investigate what general tendencies can be identified regarding party cohesion in the EP, 
with a special focus on the first decade after the 2004-enlargement. Then in the second part of the study I analyze 
how the five Central European countries that entered the European Union in 2004 fit these trends. As 2004-2014 can 
be considered as a period of political socialization for the MEPs of the new member states, the hypothesis of this 
study is that the Central European MEPs accepted the rules and the internal procedures of the European Parliament, 
adapted quickly to them and were loyal members to their political groups from the beginning.  
 
 
2. Party Cohesion Trends in the European Parliament  
In democratic political systems it is not rare that representatives are not always loyal to the official line of their parties. 
As it is a widely experienced phenomenon at the national level, one could expect to witness this even more so in the 
European Parliament, since transnational party groups work there (Judge-Earnshaw 2008: 135). In the case of 
transnational parties cohesion might be undermined by the fact that they do not only consist of different ideological 
streams but of independently acting national parties who achieve their electoral results on their own right. In theory, 
the growing powers of the EP might be also a factor against party cohesion. The reason of this is the above 
mentioned tendency that as the EP becomes more important in the decision-making process of the EU, national 
governments and parties might be more interested in influencing their MEPs. Taking this into account, we could even 
suppose that national parties aim for more control over the activities of their representatives and this reflects in the 
voting records. If the national interest ties them to a standpoint, MEPs might even vote against their own party group 
in the European Parliament.  
There has been serious academic work done in this field in the 1990s (see for example Attina 1990, 
Quanjel-Wolters 1993, Hix-Lord 1997), however thorough research of voting behavior in the European Parliament got 
to the centre of the debate only after the establishment of the European Parliamentary Research Group (EPRG) in 
1998. EPRG provides a professional platform and maybe even more importantly, a solid financial background for the 
most prestigious scholars of the European Parliament. Party cohesion is a recurring theme in their studies. Moreover, 
the EPRG carried out an ambitious research by investigating all roll call votes since 1979. It was first Simon Hix, 
Abdul Noury and Gerald Roland who published a research paper on the roll call votes of the MEPs in 2002, and later 
  
 
 
 
European Quarterly of Political Attitudes and Mentalities EQPAM  
Volume 5, No.4, October 2016 
                  ISSN 2285 – 4916 
                  ISSN-L 2285 - 4916 
Open Access at  https://sites.google.com/a/fspub.unibuc.ro/european-quarterly-of-political-attitudes-and-mentalities/ Page 49 
this was followed by a string of studies within the framework of EPRG. It is also worth to note that four EPRG 
researchers, Hix and Noury among them, launched an independent website (www.votewatch.eu) that contains a wide 
range of statistical analysis of the votes carried out in the EP. Thanks to several generous sponsors, Votewatch can 
work independently from the national governments, the European Parliament and other European institutions.  
The EP party cohesion researches conducted by EPRG and Votewatch indicate that the assumption 
according to which party cohesion has been weakened due to growing powers of the EP and the increased interest 
on behalf of the national parties, can be rejected. As Hix, Noury and Roland (2007) proved, party cohesion within EP 
groups has been always stronger than the national cohesion, and this tendency has just become stronger since 
1979. While the Agreement index (on a scale between 0 and 1, where 1 is equal to full cohesion) of the three biggest 
European party groups (European People’s Party, the Socialists and the Liberals) was 0.814 in the 1979-1984 term, 
this cohesion index reached 0.889 in the first half of the 2004-2009 term. When parties from the same country are 
measured with the same index, a reverse tendency can be experienced. During the first directly elected term national 
cohesion of the three biggest fractions was 0.667, 25 years later cohesion among parties from the same country was 
significantly lower, at 0.589. If we look at the Agreement index of the whole EP, the fifth term shows a bit stronger 
cohesion (0.842) within the party groups than in the first term (0.823). These results offer two conclusions. First, party 
based voting has been always more dominant than national voting since 1979. Second, party cohesion has become 
stronger in the last more than three decades. After all, it can be concluded that voting behavior of the MEPs has 
turned into more “party based” and less “nationalist”. 
A further important lesson is that in spite of the high levels of the Agreement index, party cohesion in the 
European Parliament has been weaker than in the national parliaments in Europe, but is somewhat higher than in the 
US Congress (Hix et al. 2002: 9). The investigation of the roll call votes since 1979 also suggests that party cohesion 
grew parallel with the powers of the European Parliament. This statement is backed by the fact that the strengthening 
of party cohesion accelerated after the acceptance of the Amsterdam Treaty (Judge-Earnshaw 2008: 139). This 
document transferred significant powers to the European Parliament, therefore the inter-institutional dynamics of the 
European Union started to push the party groups towards the formation of more solid voting blocks.  
The natural background of the fact that intra-party mechanisms are more decisive at voting than national 
political embeddedness is that EP party groups are set up on ideological streams rather than national basis. It would 
be indeed illogical from the national parties to send the representatives to the European Parliament with a strictly tied 
mandate. A mandate without the opportunity to decide freely would make little sense in a world where none of the 
countries possesses enough power to achieve substantial results alone. National co-operation is no guarantee for 
any policy results – the representatives of the biggest countries can be outnumbered easily by the others. Therefore, 
a tied mandate would just provide an obstacle for the MEPs to get to the winning side by acting freely in the internal 
power play of the European Parliament.  
Scully (2005) draws the attention to another potential explanatory factor of the strengthening party cohesion: 
by investigating the “going native” hypothesis, he assumed that institutional socialization plays the most decisive role 
in voting behavior. The most important research question for Scully was if the parliamentarians in Brussels internalize 
the local values and attitudes, and as a result they become more loyal to them. Concerning voting behavior this 
would imply that MEPs act and vote loyally to the policy approaches of their European party group. This research 
also demonstrated what Hix and his co-authors concluded before, that party based cohesion is stronger than national 
cohesion, but Scully emphasized that it is not the impact of “going native”. Attitudes and values internalized before 
the EP mandate, and own conviction had much more explanatory power regarding voting behavior.  
From the point of view of an MEP it is of key importance how often the majoritarian national opinions do not 
coincide with the official standpoint of the European party group. If there are such cases regularly, it might cause 
tensions either within the party group or among the fellow countrymen. Official statistics of the European Parliament 
show that this scenario is quite rare. As an example it can be mentioned that the majoritarian opinion within the party 
and the national delegation went in the same way in 90% of the votes between 1999 and 2004 (Judge-Earnshaw 
2008: 138).   
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The statistics shown in this chapter are based on the roll call votes of the last decades. Even the EPRG 
researchers admit that roll call votes might not provide a totally representative result as not all of the votes are 
organized according to this method. Despite this fact, Hix et al. (2007: 30) hold that the investigation of roll call votes 
is an adequate research method as this is how the most important votes happen. Carrubba (2006) accepts that roll 
call votes are important, however, he expresses concerns regarding this methodology. The core of the critics is that 
several party groups use roll call votes for strategic purposes, assuming that this format in itself is an incentive to 
stick to the party’s official direction. Following this line of thinking, it cannot be surprising if the statistics reflect high 
party cohesion index. According to Carrubba, this is a self-fulfilling act: party cohesion is strong, but it is strong 
exactly because the party did its best to push their MEPs into the same direction. Carrubba questions the most 
frequent method used to analyze party cohesion, but he does not claim that it would make no sense at all. His 
conclusion is just that it would be wise to be a bit more careful with the interpretation of roll call votes.  
Despite the critics surrounding the roll call votes, it is clear that party cohesion is not independent from 
policy fields. It does matter what issue is the roll call vote about. By analyzing the vote database of Votewatch about 
the 2004-2009 and the 2009-2014 terms, there is some evidence to back this statement. As it can be seen in Table 
1, party cohesion was high (above 0.85) in all groups between2004-2009, except the Eurosceptic party groups. The 
Socialist and the Green parliamentary fractions were the most disciplined (0.91), but the Liberals (0.89), the People’s 
Party (0.88) and the United Left (0.85) were also close. Regarding the Eurosceptic party groups, a good level of 
cohesion was experienced in the Union of European Nations, but in the case of the Independence and Democracy 
party group, the lack of discipline was obvious (0.47). The Agreement index of the latter was just slightly higher than 
the data of the non-affiliated MEPs, who did not even work within any organized framework.  
In spite of strong cohesion, there were certain differences regarding the nature of co-operation between the 
three biggest party groups (People’s Party, Socialists, Liberals) during the 2004-2009 term. The conservative 
European People’s Party voted especially united (above 0.90) in issues related to international trade, justice and 
home affairs and fisheries. Cohesion was significantly lower than average (below 0.85) in agriculture, gender issues, 
budgetary control and internal regulations of the EP. The Party of European Socialists – as the most united party 
group – had an Agreement index over 0.90 in 12 policy fields, and was almost completely disciplined (over 0.94) in 
four areas: development, civil liberties, gender issues and budget. The weaker points of the Socialists included only 
two policy fields: agriculture and the internal regulations of the EP. The Liberals reached at least 0.90 in seven 
policies, including budgetary control, development and international trade. The Liberals had an Agreement index 
below 0.85 in two areas: internal market and consumer protection, and similarly to the other two big party groups, in 
the internal regulations of the EP.  
The 2009-2014 term brought even more disciplined party groups. Transnational party groups influenced 
voting behavior to an even bigger extent than in the previous five years (see Table 2). Three out of the seven party 
groups had an Agreement index above 0.90, close to full cohesion. The Greens voted united in almost all policy 
areas (overall index: 0.95), but the People’s Party (0.93), the Socialists and Democrats (0.92) were also very much 
disciplined. The Liberals (ALDE, 0.88) and the Eurosceptic European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR, 0.87) also 
showed considerable cohesion. These policies include culture and education for both the People’s Party and the 
Liberals, while besides these two fields the Greens were totally united in transport and gender as well.  
Further evidence of the strengthening cohesion in the 2009-2014 term is that the number of those fields 
where the Agreement index was at least at 0.90 increased significantly. MEPs of the European People’s Party 
reached this level in 16 and the Socialists (S&D) in 18 policy areas, while this high level of cohesion characterized 
the Greens in all policies, except the internal regulations of the EP. While in 2004-2009 it was a rare phenomenon to 
have an Agreement Index 0.95 or above, it has become quite frequent in the subsequent five years. It was a growing 
number of policy fields, in which a certain party group voted almost unanimously in almost all cases throughout five 
years. EPP had 10 of such ‘consensus’ policy areas, S&D was at 8, and the Greens, the most united party group of 
the 2009-2014 period, voted in block in the majority (12) of all policy areas. 
Relatively low cohesion (<0.85) practically disappeared within the two biggest party groups. EPP 
experienced an Agreement Index below 0.85 only in issues related to gender equality. The number of policies where 
the S&D produced less cohesion was two: agriculture and the internal regulations of the EP were these issues. The 
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Greens had only one policy area below 0.85 (internal regulations). ALDE reached its lowest levels of cohesion in 
agriculture and internal regulations, the ECR produced its worst results in the areas where EU spending is the 
highest (regional development and agriculture) and the radical left GUE-NGL performed poorly in keeping the unity in 
agriculture, budget and internal regulations of the EP.  
From these results it can be concluded that agriculture and the internal regulations are the two fields where 
party cohesion is the weakest in general. However, it must be stressed that party cohesion in these fields is still not 
low. It is rather appropriate to talk about a slightly lower party cohesion than in the other policy areas where the 
leading party groups are extremely disciplined.      
  
 
3. How Loyal Are the Central European MEPs?  
The data shown in the previous chapter demonstrated that the party loyalty of the MEPs have strengthened 
throughout the first two parliamentary cycles after the accession of the Central European countries. This also implies 
that the enlargement of the European Union, the appearance of new MEPs of new member states, and in general the 
fragmentation of the European party groups have not had a negative impact on party cohesion.  
The characteristics of the EP as a whole seem to be true in the case of Central European MEPs as well: 
voting based on European political group affiliation is decisive (Hix et al. 2007, Votewatch 2011, Votewatch 2015). 
Discipline towards the European party groups was outstanding in these countries (on average it was above 93 
percent), with the exception of the Czech MEPs (Table 3). The Czech case can be explained with the fact that MEPs 
from the ODS party did not feel ‘comfortable’ in ideological terms in the European People’s Party. Their members 
struggled to adapt themselves to the committed pro-European standpoint of EPP, which was reflected in their poor 
loyalty towards their European party group when it came to the votes (ODS loyalty to EPP was only 77 percent in 
2004-2009). This problem was solved in the 2009-2014 term by leaving EPP and joining the Eurosceptic ECR group. 
This change apparently fitted ODS MEPs more: they voted with ECR in 95% of all votes, which brought the average 
loyalty of Czech Republic from 82% to 92% (Table 4).  
 
Table 1. Cohesion index of the party groups in the European Parliament in all policy areas, July 2004 – June 2009 
(between 0 and 1, full cohesion=1) (see APPENDIX) 
 
 
Table 2. Cohesion index of the party groups in the European Parliament in all policy areas, July 2009 – April 2014 
(between 0 and 1, full cohesion=1) (see APPENDIX) 
 
 
MEPs of the four other Central European countries followed the standpoints of their European political 
groups overwhelmingly. Loyalty of Hungarian, Polish, Slovakian and Slovenian MEPs was all above 95%. 
 
Table 3. Loyalty to EP political groups, by countries, 2004-2009 
 
Czech 
Republic 
Hungary Poland Slovakia Slovenia Total 
Loyalty to 
European 
group 
82.52% 96.19% 95.19% 98.08% - (96.93%) 93.36% 
Source: www.votewatch.eu 
Note: Only those national groups are considered in the statistics of Votewatch that were made up of at least 5 MEPs. For Slovenia I 
calculated the average of individual loyalty to the European political group.  
 
 
Table 4 shows that loyalty to the European political group remained strong in the 2009-2014 term. The 
loyalty of Polish and Slovakian MEPs somewhat decreased compared to the previous five years, but the change is 
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not significant. In general, it can be stated that the Central European MEPs are loyal members of their European 
political families. They rarely behave as ‘rebels’ and vote against the official European party line. The strong loyalty of 
each Central European country obviously means that the aggregate loyalty index of the five countries is also high: 
Central European MEPs voted in 92.68% of all votes with their European parties in the 2009-2014 term. This data 
indicates that the Central European MEPs are definitely not acting as destabilizers in their groups, but rather 
strengthen party cohesion. 
 
Table 4. Loyalty to EP political groups, by countries, 2009-2014 
 Czech 
Republic 
Hungary Poland Slovakia Slovenia Total 
National 
average 
91.99% 95.38% 91.02% 93.91% 96.99% 92.68% 
Number of 
relevant 
MEPs 
22 19 50 13 7 111 
Source: Collected and calculated by the author based on the data of www.votewatch.eu 
Note: Non-affiliated MEPs (altogether 3 MEPs) are left out from the calculations.  
 
 
The investigation of the Central European MEPs also proves that MEPs of the bigger parliamentary groups 
tend to vote more in line with the standpoints of their party (Table 5). In 2009-2014, only three Central European 
MEPs were members of the third most influential fraction (ALDE), but they voted in the same way the most (95.8%). 
The 25 Socialist MEPs (S&D was the second biggest group in the EP in 2009-2014) of the five countries also tended 
to vote nearly always with the majority of their party (95.79%). The most Central European MEPs – 53 people – 
belonged to the European People’s Party and they also vote in a highly disciplined way (95.06%). The fact that 
almost half of the Eurosceptic European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) came from Central European countries 
(mainly from Poland and the Czech Republic) was an interesting indicator of the region’s political landscape. The 21 
ECR MEPs of the Central European region were also quite loyal (89.30%). Beyond these four parliamentary groups, 
five men strong EFD (73.18%), the four Czech communist MEPs (GUE/NGL, 81.37%), and the three non-affiliated 
MEPs of the Hungarian radical right Jobbik party must be mentioned, to have a full picture of the Central European 
region’s representatives between 2009 and 2014.    
 
Table 5. Central European MEPs’ loyalty to EP political groups, by political groups, 2009-2014 
 EPP S&D ECR EFD GUE/NG
L 
ALDE Total 
Party average 95,06% 95,79% 89,30% 73,18% 81,37% 95,8% 92,68% 
Number of 
relevant MEPs 
53 25 21 5 4 3 111 
Source: Collected and calculated by the author based on the data of www.votewatch.eu 
Note: Non-affiliated MEPs (altogether 3 MEPs) are left out from the calculations.  
 
 
The data available on loyalty to national party of the Central European MEPs (Table 6) indicate that those 
politicians who represent the same national party in the EP vote in the same way even more frequently. It is rather 
exceptional to find votes when there would be a split between MEPs of the same national party. In the 2009-2014 
term this practically did not happen among MEPs from Slovakia and Slovenia (the loyalty to the national parties was 
above 99 percent in both countries), but the loyalty rate was also very high in the cases of Czech, Hungarian and 
Polish MEPs (96-97 percent).    
 
Table 6. Loyalty to national party, by countries, 2009-2014 
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 Czech 
Republic 
Hungary Poland Slovakia Slovenia Total 
National average 96,22% 97,07% 97,36% 99,27% 99,52% 97,36% 
Number of relevant 
MEPs 
20 21 47 11 4 103 
Source: Collected and calculated by the author based on the data of www.votewatch.eu 
Note: Those MEPs who represent their national parties alone in the EP (altogether 11 MEPs) are left out from the calculations. 
 
 
There are no big differences regarding loyalty to the national party on ideological grounds either (Table 7). 
National parties of all European political groups are very cohesive. However, although the difference is slight, those 
national parties that send MEPs to the two biggest European political groups (EPP and S&D) are the most 
disciplined. In the EPP and S&D there is not much room of maneuver for the national parties as they follow the 
official line in 95-96 percent of the votes. However, it must be added that cohesion within the national parties exist in 
roughly half of the ‘rebel’ votes (in cases when there is disagreement between the European group and the national 
group). This is reflected in the fact that the loyalty to national party is 2-3 percentage points higher than the loyalty to 
the EPP and S&D.   
 
Table 7. Loyalty to national party, by EP party groups, 2009-2014 
 EPP S&D ECR GUE/NGL Non-
affiliated 
Total 
National average 98,07% 97,64% 96,75% 95,32% 90,92 97,36% 
Number of relevant 
MEPs 
50 23 23 4 3 103 
Source: Collected and calculated by the author based on the data of www.votewatch.eu 
Note: Those MEPs who represent their national parties alone in the EP (altogether 11 MEPs) are left out from the calculations. As 
ALDE members of Central Europe all belong to this category, ALDE group is left out from the calculations.  
 
 
Based on the data presented in this chapter, it can be stated that the voting behavior of Central European 
MEPs reflects a strong party politics character. The biggest European party families are the most efficient in 
enforcing party discipline. However, it is important to underline that national party cohesion can be detected in votes 
when the national party line differs from the agreed political direction of the European political group as well. National 
political groups have a bigger room of maneuver in the smaller political groups. In ECR and GUE-NGL the difference 
between loyalty to the national party and the European party group is significantly higher (7 and 14 points, 
respectively in 2009-2014) than in EPP and S&D. This means that those politicians who represent the same national 
party vote together even in situations when the pressure to follow the European official line is not as strong as in the 
cases of the biggest and most influential political groups.    
 
 
4. Conclusion 
The empirical research carried out in this paper demonstrate that the MEPs of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovakia and Slovenia have not brought more division in the European Parliament to their political groups, but have 
been loyal members of their European parties. Regarding the two principals of the MEPs, at first sight it might appear 
as if loyalty to the national party would be the most important factor behind voting patterns. While in the case of 
Central European MEPs this seems to be true for politicians who are members of smaller – and as a consequence, 
less influential – European political groups (such as ECR, GUE-NGL, EFD), the data about the two leading parties 
(EPP and S&D) suggest that the overall picture might be more complex. Loyalty to the EPP and S&D official line was 
95-96 percent in 2009-2014, which means that Central European MEPs of very different national parties followed the 
same direction, almost always. In these cases loyalty to the national party was equal to being loyal to the European 
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political group. The indexes of “loyalty to the national party” were high because most parties as a whole voted 
together with their European party. Therefore it would be most probably wrong to conclude that loyalty to national 
party was more important than loyalty to the European political group, just because for EPP and S&D members 
loyalty to national party indexes were slightly higher than loyalty to European party data. A more realistic scenario is 
that the compromises reached in EPP and S&D before the vote set the direction for most politicians on most 
occasions. Clear ’rebel’ cases, when national parties as a whole went against their European political groups are not 
more than 2-3 percent of all votes in the two biggest European political families.  
Party cohesion in the EP was already very strong during the 2004-2009 term. This tendency went even 
further in the 2009-2014 term. The fact, that we could find policy fields in which almost all votes of the last five years 
supported the official party standpoint in several political groups, is an obvious sign of that. Cohesion is the strongest 
in the biggest parliamentary fractions. This is not surprising since these are the parties that have the chance to 
achieve substantial policy results – in case, they can stand up for an issue together.  
It is important to stress that the Central European member states that joined the EU in 2004 and their MEPs 
have not weakened the cohesion of the EP party groups. Party cohesion was even further strengthened after that the 
Central European MEPs started to work in Brussels and Strasbourg. They are indeed loyal to their European party 
groups: in the first term after the accession they voted 93, then between 2009-2014 92 percent of the total votes in 
accordance with their European political groups. Therefore, we can conclude that the new Central European member 
states not only did not bring more nationalism to the European Parliament, but they rather contributed to an EP that is 
even more based on party politics.  
Party discipline has become so strong in the most influential European political groups that voting behavior 
can no longer be regarded as a relevant indicator of different political roles among MEPs. Party affiliation explains 
voting behavior to such an extent that it might be needed to rather look at other forms of activities inside and outside 
the EP to identify what individual strategies, political roles MEPs have. It is reasonable to assume that different 
approaches to representation might be better reflected in what other activities MEPs spend their time and energy on 
(drafting reports, amending reports, plenary speeches, co-operation with other EU institutions, connection with 
national party and media, etc.).    
The roots of the party cohesion strengthening process can be found in the growing institutional powers of 
the European Parliament. Due to this general trend, nowadays the stakes are much higher for both the national 
governments and the party groups concerning what decisions are made in the EP. While national unity in itself, 
without the support of several other countries has absolutely no chance to succeed with any initiatives, occasional, 
issue-based coalitions of the biggest EP party groups possess a real opportunity to form a working majority. The 
“grand coalition” is one of the most interesting phenomena of the everyday political life in the EP. The reason behind 
the frequent co-operation of the strongest party groups is that the European Parliament has to carry its point in the 
institutional triangle of the EU. Stronger cohesion within and between party groups might be turned into political 
capital in the struggle with the European Commission and the European Council. As a consequence, building strong 
voting block is not a goal in itself but has become a vital tool in European politics, and the Central European MEPs 
have been disciplined members in this institutional power game.  
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